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ABSTRACT 
 
This study addresses the linkages between lending structure and market risk exposure. 
The influence of lending structure is analysed by four measures: the real estate lending, 
the specialisation index, the short-term lending stability, and the medium-term lending 
stability. Our findings show that lending structure to some extent affects the market risk 
exposure to some extend. At the same time, listed bank holding companies showed higher 
levels of market risk during and after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Meanwhile, the 
desired effect of bank mergers in terms of reducing market risk exposure did not 
materialise in this study. Thus, the findings of this study posits at least two implications; 
(1) policy makers should react accordingly in the decision-making process towards 
achieving the expected result of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, and (2) 
banks and investors should account the impact of lending structures in addition to the 
significance effect of loan expansion and management efficiency when determining 
market risk exposure of bank holding companies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Market risk is a subject that has received much attention in the banking literature. 
Indeed, the ongoing global financial crisis has heightened intention in this 
particular subject. While prior studies show an increase in loan growth increases 
market risk, the structure of loan portfolio also play a vital role. Strategising 
lending structure has become popular since Hanson, Pesaran and Schuermann 
(2008) proved theoretically that risk might be diversified if bank lending goes to 
different sectors, even in cases of a sufficiently large portfolios. Marcucci and 
Quagliariello (2009) also found that varying levels of portfolio riskiness has 
different effect during various phases of the economic cycles. They show that 
expansion efforts of riskier banks (due to high credit risk) are four times more 
affected during recessions than less-risky banks. Riskier banks are also three 
times more affected by the impact of economic conditions during recession than 
less-risky banks. This implies that strategising bank portfolios is crucial, 
particular when structuring lending, because it has a different impact on bank risk 
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exposure in different economic cycles. Besides risk exposure, Rossi, Schwaiger 
and Winkler (2009) also found that different lending structure affect bank 
efficiency and capitalisation. Further, Blasko and Sinkey Jr. (2006) showed that 
concentration in real estate lending can challenge the ability of the US banks to 
manage interest rate risk. In the Malaysian context, Ahmad and Ariff (2004) 
found that lending to risky sectors is negatively related to the market risk 
exposure of depository institutions.  However, Madura, Martin, and Taylor (1994) 
showed inconsistent results between the depositories and banking institutions. 
Therefore, this study aims to investigate the relationship between lending 
structure and market risk in the case of commercial banks. Prior research has 
primarly addressed either the real estate lending or lending specialisation. This 
study incorporates the stability factor of lending structure in both short- and 
medium-term, in addition to these two normative measures. To the best of the 
authors' knowledge, this study is the first attempt to investigate the stability effect 
of lending structure. The stability models are adopted from Ibrahim and Amin 
(2004), Amin and Ferrantino (1997; 1999) who study the impact of export 
structures on the economic growth. Against this background, the novelty of this 
study can be addressed in at least three ways, by focusing on: (i) market risk 
exposure developed from three-factor Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM),          
(ii) lending structure measures (real estate lending, specialisation index, short- 
and medium-term lending structure stability) and (iii) commercial banks in a 
developing country like Malaysia. 
 
This paper is divided into six sections including the introduction. Section 2 
describes the lending behaviour of the commercial banks in Malaysia for the 
study period. Section 3 outlines a literature review, and Section 4 highlights the 
data and methodology. Section 5 that presents the empirical findings, and finally 
Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
 
LENDING BEHAVIOUR IN MALAYSIA 
 
Figure 1 shows the trend of lending behaviour for the commercial banks in 
Malaysia. In real estate lending [Figure 1(a)], there is an upward sloping trend, 
particularly after 1995. Expansionary monetary policy and continuous 
improvement of the economy have attracted large capital inflow and direct 
foreign investments into the country. This economic phenomenon was the basis 
for the strong and sound banking system in 1996, so it was not surprising that the 
demand for real estate lending skyrocketed from 1995 to 1996. This demand 
maintained an upward trend with steady growth, except for a hiccup from 2003 to 
2005. Nonetheless, the growth of real estate lending is not risk-free. In June 2009, 
the monthly aggregate data for the Malaysian commercial banks showed that the 
highest non-performing loan (NPL) came from the real estate lending, at around 
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45.66% (NPL for real estate lending is RM14.8 million out of total NPL RM32.4 
million) (BNM Statistical Bulletin, August 2009). For the short-run lending 
stability [Figure 1(b)], the overall short-run lending composition ranges from 
0.72 to 0.92, inferring that the Malaysian lending portfolio is rather stable. The 
low lending composition change (LCC) value in 2005 is due to changes in 
reporting style. Instead of categorising the loan by sectors, loans are now 
categorised by economic purpose.1
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 For the specialisation index [Figure 1(c)], the 
dramatic drop from 1994 to 1996 shows that banks had a more specialised initial 
lending strategy, but tended to diversify after 1996 before reverting to specialised 
lending in 2004. Finally, Figure 1(d) demonstrates the variance of the 
traditionality index across sectors, based on five-year intervals. Variance of 
traditionally (VART) is employed to investigate the stability of the lending 
composition in the medium-term. Data from 1996 to 2003 shows a divergent 
lending structure pattern. This indicates that banks are remaining flexible when 
reacting against their risk-return profile and customers' demands as a strategy in 
maintain a sound banking system through periods of financial crisis. 
.72
.76
.80
.84
.88
.92
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
Mean of LCC
 
 (a) (b) 
 
.12
.16
.20
.24
.28
.32
.36
.40
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
Mean of SPEC
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
Mean of VART
 
 (c) (d) 
 
Figure 1.  Trends of lending structure: (a) share of broad property sector, lending real 
estate and risky sectors to total lending, (b) change in lending composition 
(LCC), (c) specialisation of lending (SPEC), and (d) variance of traditionality 
index (VART). 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Studies on the determinants of bank risk exposures per se are very limited. So far, 
only Madura et al. (1994) and Ahmad and Ariff (2003) had explicitly examined 
the factors affecting the risk exposure of financial institutions. For the former, 
Madura et al. (1994) researched the determinants of the ex-ante risk for the 
deposit-taking institutions and commercial banks in the US. 2  Their findings 
showed that depository institutions and commercial banks have different 
determinants, inferring that each entity should be studied separately.3 For the 
later, Ahmad and Ariff (2003) investigated the determinants of the CAPM risk 
measures using the single-factor CAPM approach. Unlike Madura et al. (1994), 
they only focused on the Malaysian deposit-taking institutions.4 They analyse 14 
bank-specific variables (BSV) on equity risk, market risk, total risk and 
unsystematic risk exposure.5 Their findings show that each type of risk exposures 
has different risk determinant.6
 
  
As the theoretical framework for risk exposure is not yet established, most 
studies include the BSV when investigating a specific risk-related issue. 
Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) incorporated three BSV when studying 
ownership structures of the US banking institutions: financial leverage, operating 
leverage, and size. They found that BSV affect seven types of risk exposure 
differently. In another ownership study, Anderson and Fraser (2000) applied an 
additional BSV of frequency. They believed that frequency (defined as the ratio 
of an average daily share volume traded to number of outstanding shares) could 
represent the level of business risk exposure since it denoted the speed at which 
new info is captured in stock prices and correlated to variances in bank balance 
sheets and off-balance sheet portfolios. Their findings showed that size is 
negatively related to total risk, but positively related to market risk. Meanwhile, 
frequency is positively related to total and market risks. While Saunders et al. 
(1990) and Anderson and Fraser (2000) analysed US banks, Konishi and Yasuda 
(2004) examined the same issues for Japanese banks. They found that size and 
capital buffer are negatively related market risk exposure. For Spanish banks, 
Marco and Fernandez (2008) employed three BSV (size, profitability and type of 
business). Studying bank governance across many countries, Laeven and Levine 
(2009) and Angkinand and Wihlborg (2009) incorporated both BSV and country-
specific variables (CSV) as control variables. Depending on the countries 
involved, they included CSV such as per capita income, rights, capital 
requirements, capital stringency, restrict, deposit insurance, enforcement of 
contracts, merger and acquisition, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) volatility. 
The BSV employed were size, credit quality, capital buffer, and liquidity ratio). 
Since this study focuses on Malaysia, CSV will be ignored. Taken together, 
studies on ownership structure for a single country show that BSV include size, 
credit quality, liquidity ratio, and capital buffer.   
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Focusing on loan sales and risk, Hassan (1993) incorporated six BSV that 
comprise credit, interest rate, and business variables.7 Based on five market risk 
measures, he found that lending specialisation and loan expansion are positively 
related to all types of market risk measures.8 Unlike Hassan (1993), Cebenoyan 
and Strahan (2004) applied four BSV that consisted of capital, liquidity, and 
credit variables.9 Analysing four accounting risk measures, he found all BSV to 
be significant.10 Capital and liquidity variables are inversely related to risk, and 
vice versa for credit variables. Examining the impact of derivative activities on 
the interest rates and exchange rate risks of Asian-Pacific banks, Yong, Faff, and 
Chalmers (2009) employed seven BSV reflecting business, capital, liquidity, 
interest rate, and credit related variables. 11
     
 In sum, studies about off-balance 
sheet activities have shown that the generally accepted BSV are credit, interest 
rate, liquidity, capital, and business variables.  
Focusing on mutual fund investment, Gallo, Apilado and Kolari (1996) 
incorporate five BSV which reflected credit, investment, capital, and business 
activities. 12
 
 Analysing the market, industry, and unsystematic risk, they 
discovered three interesting findings: (i) not all BSV are significant to the 
unsystematic risk; (ii) loan expansion is negatively related to market risk; and  
(iii) loan expansion, investment, and mutual fund activities are inversely related 
to industry risk.   
Looking into the effect of income structure on credit risk of European banks, 
Lepetit, Nys, Rous and Tarazi (2008) employed five BSV reflecting business, 
credit, and capital variables.13
 
 Studying five accounting risk measures (standard 
deviation of Return of Asset (ROA), standard deviation of Return of Equity 
(ROE), loan loss provisions to total loans, Zrisk index, and ZP-score) and three 
market risk measure using single-CAPM (total risk, unsystematic risk and market 
risk), they concluded that size is positively related to all market and accounting 
risk measures while capital buffer is inversely related.   
With regard to the impact of foreign-owned banks on bank liquidity risk in ten 
European emerging economies, Dinger (2009) adopted three BSV (size, size 
squared, capital buffer) and four CSV (deposit rate, interbank rate, GDP growth, 
and per capita GDP). For the BSV, his results show that size is inversely related 
but capital buffer is positively related to liquidity risk.    
 
As the theoretical grounds of risk have not yet been established, this study 
employs the BSV that reflect credit, capital, interest rate, liquidity, and business 
related variables to investigate the impact of lending structure on market risk 
exposure. This is done to avoid the model mis-specification errors if the relevant 
variables are omitted according to Gujarati (2003). 
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This model is estimated using unbalanced panel data using the generalised least 
squares (GLS) estimation. Gujarati (2003) found that GLS estimation helps to 
tackle the issue of non-normality distribution of variables, which may be caused 
by heteroscedasticity. Sayrs (1989) suggested that GLS corrected for errors may 
be used when a model exhibits autocorrelation and/or moving average errors. 
Wooldridge (2002) concluded that GLS is a asymptotically more efficient than 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimations. In this study, the following three 
models are tested: 'pooled effect', fixed effect, and random effect model. The best 
model is selected based on the Likelihood Ratio and Hausman tests. To cater to 
the heteroskedasticity issue, this study incorporates cross-section weight in the 
GLS estimation. Following Shahimi (unpublished) and Zakaria (unpublished), 
first order autocorrelation problem is tackled based on the Park's model by 
incorporating AR(1) in the regression model. This study comprises of all 11 
listed bank holding companies in Malaysia for 1994–2006. Data from 2007 
onwards are excluded because of volatile global economy development such as 
the food shortage crisis, oil crisis, and the US subprime crisis, all of US which 
could affect the findings of this study. If these crises are taken into consideration 
with dummy variables, the regression analysis cannot be run due to the limited 
number of observations. The research design is as follows:  
 
Zit = αi + βLSit + γxit + δYit + εit 
 
where Z is a measure of banks' market risk, LS is a measure of lending structure, 
X is a vector of BSV, Y is crisis and financial consolidation dummies, αi is an 
individual-specific intercept, β, γ and δ are slope coefficients to be estimated. 
  
Market risk is estimated based on three-factor CAPM that will be discussed in the 
next subsection. Similarly, the lending structure variables will be discussed in 
detail following the market risk measure. As controlled variables, the BSV are: 
ratio of total loan to total asset (TL), ratio of provisions for loan loss to total asset 
(PLL), ratio of total equity to total asset (TE), ratio of GAP to total asset (GAP), 
ratio of interest expense to total asset (INTEXP), liquid asset to total asset (INV), 
logarithm of total asset (LTA), non-interest income to total asset (NONII) and 
earning asset to total asset (MGT). These variables represent loan expansion, loan 
quality, capital buffer, cost of fund, interest rate variable, liquid asset, size, 
deviation from traditional banking activities, and management efficiency, 
respectively. In line with the literature review, note that: (i) credit variables are 
TL and PLL, (ii) capital variables are TE, (iii) interest rate variables are GAP and 
INTEXP, (iv) liquid variable is INV, and finally (v) business-related variables are 
TA, NONII, and MGT. The inclusion of these variables is motivated by the 
works of Saunders et al. (1990), Hassan (1993), Madura et al. (1994), Gallo et al. 
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(1996), Angbazo (1997), Anderson and Fraser (2000), Gonzales (2004), and 
Ahmad and Ariff (2004). For the crisis dummies, CRISIS represents during 
Asian financial crisis period (1 for year 1997 & 1998, 0 otherwise) and PCRISIS 
represents the post crisis period (1 for 1999 onwards, 0 otherwise). For the 
financial consolidation dummy, PMERGER represents the post merger period           
(1 for post-merger period, 0 otherwise)  
 
The expected relationship follows previous empirical finding. For TL, Hassan 
(1993), Madura et al. (1994), Gallo et al. (1996) suggested that loan illiquidity 
and default are the reasons for the positive relationship. For PLL, many studies 
hypothesise that loan loss provision represents the probability for future default; 
which is thus expected to be positively related to risk. For TE, equity is perceived 
to provide a buffer against loss, which is thus expected to be inversely related to 
risk. For GAP, a positive GAP bank (or an asset sensitive bank) is exposed to 
risk and interest rates will fall, and vice versa. Thus, GAP is expected to be 
positively related to risk. For INTEXP, Madura et al. (1994) opined that risk 
depends on the supply of net interest income (measured by interest expense).  
The higher the INTEXP, the higher the volatility of net interest income and the 
riskier the bank, conjecturing a positive relationship. For INV, risk is linked from 
the perspective of deposit withdrawals. Having idle cash is an opportunity cost to 
banks, which instead hold short-term investment securities to standby 
extraordinary deposit withdrawals. For LTA, Saunders et al. (1990), Hassan 
(1993) argued that bigger banks can better diversify business risk and adjust 
unexpected liquidity and capital shortfall, thus reducing bank risk. However, 
Anderson and Fraser (2000) suggested that the impact of size on risk depends on 
the lending structure.  If the loan portfolio is the same, bigger banks should have 
lower risk than smaller bank. Otherwise, a bigger bank will face higher risk due 
to its tendency to embark into riskier lending sectors that could provide higher 
returns. Similarly, Gonzales (2004) posited that the existence of the economies of 
scale, increase market power, and the "too big to fail" policy of big banks could 
cause larger banks to enter risky activities either through lending strategies or 
off-balance sheet activities. Against this background, LTA can be positive or 
negative. For NONII, Madura et al. (1994) suggest diversification from the 
traditional role banking (lending) which can reduce risk, inferring an inverse 
relationship.  Finally, for MGT, Angbazo (1997), Ahmad and Ariff (2003; 2004), 
Ahmad and Ahmad (2004) and A. Rahman, Ibrahim and Meera (in press) showed 
that efficiency can influence bank risk exposure. A negative association infers an 
efficient management. As earning assets are exposed to economic development, 
an inverse relationship implied that bank management is efficient. For the crisis 
dummies, it is expected that CRISIS has positive coefficient sign, indicating that 
market risk exposure is higher during a crisis period. Meanwhile, PCRISIS can 
be positive or negative, depending on the recovery process. Positive signs infer a 
Aisyah Abdul Rahman 
8 
slow recovery process and vice-versa for negative sign. For the post-merger 
dummy PMERGER, a negative sign is expected, indicating that banks have 
lower market risk exposure after a merger.      
 
Specification for Market Risk Exposure 
 
While most studies adopt the single-factor CAPM to determine the market risk 
exposure of the banking sector, this study employs the three-factor CAPM. This 
is done for two reasons. First, the establishment of two-factor CAPM in pricing 
the financial institutions started in the mid-1970s; some theoretical and empirical 
research on the two-factor CAPM were conducted by Friend and Blume (1970), 
Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), Stone (1974), Martin and Keown (1977), 
Chance and Lane (1980), Lynge and Zumwalt (1980), Brooth and Officer (1985), 
Flannery and James (1984), French and Fraser (1986), and Lloyd and Shick 
(1997). Second, recent studies have proposed a three-factor CAPM in pricing the 
financial institutions such as Chamberlain, Howe, and popper (1997) and Hahm 
(2004), Francis and Hunter (2004), Yong et al. (2009), and Wong, Wong and 
Leung (2009). Both types of studies highlight the significance of the exchange 
rate index as another factor on top of the two. Ignoring the effect of interest rates 
and foreign exchange rate movement in pricing bank stock returns would result 
in misinterpreting the market risk exposure per se, as it may capture the 
fluctuation of interest rate and exchange rate. Against this evolution, the yearly 
market risk exposure (βm) is estimated based on the three-factor CAPM, which 
can be expressed as follows:  
 
Rt = αj + βm (Rmt) + βi (Rit) + βforex (Rforext) + εt 
 
where: 
 
Rt      =  return of bank during period t, 
Rmt    =  daily market return (Kuala Kumpur Composite Index) from            
t – 1 to t, 
Rit      =  daily long-term interest rate changes (Malaysian government 
securities 10 years) from t – 1 to t, 
Rforext  =  daily foreign exchange rate (nominal effective exchange rate) 
changes from t – 1 to t, 
βforex  = beta coefficient for exchange rate (exchange rate risk exposure) 
εt         =  the error term which captures all other factors that affect bank 
return that are not taken into account explicitly. 
αj        =  the intercept of the characteristic line.  
βi = beta coefficient for interest rate (interest rate risk exposure) 
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Specification for Lending Structure Variables  
 
Real estate lending 
 
Several studies have attempted to investigate the impact of real estate lending on 
bank risk, but there is no standard definition of the real estate sector per se. In 
order to remain comparable to previous studies, this study employs three 
measures: (i) Real Estate (RE) lending, (ii) Broad Property Sector (BPS) lending 
and (iii) Risky Sector (RISKY) lending.14
 
   
Lending composition change (LCC) 
 
The LCC captures the short-run stability in lending composition.15
 
 The LCC is 
computed as follows: 
12
1
1
LCC min(s ,s )it it
i
−
=
=∑  
 
where sit is the share of sector i in total lending in year t.  It takes on a maximum 
value of 1 if there is no change in lending composition and a minimum value of 0 
if the portfolio of lending by sector loan was not loaned in the previous year. 
Thus, a high value of LCC suggests short-run stability of lending composition. 
 
Specialised index (SPEC) 
 
Similar to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, SPEC is constructed as follows: 
   
12
2
1
SPEC s it
i=
=∑  
 
where, si is the lending share of industry i in total lending. A score approaching 1 
suggest a high degree of loan concentration while a score approaching 0 indicates 
a high degree of diversification.  
 
Variance of traditionality index (VART) 
 
VART measures changes in the lending composition over an intermediate term. 
It is a variance of traditionality index (TI), which is calculated using five-year 
intervals for each sector. The TI for 1995 is computed using data from 1993 to 
1997; 1996, uses data from 1994 to 1998, and so on. The TI formula is as follows: 
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2 , 2cTI
5
l
l i t
it
=
=− −Σ=  
 
where the cumulative lending experience (Cit) for each industry is calculated as: 
 
0
1
0
e
C
e
t
i t it
it t
i t it
=
=
Σ
=
Σ
 
 
where t0 and t1 are initial and terminal periods of the data and eit is lending of 
industry i in year t. Since VART is a variance of TI across sectors, high variance 
indicates an episode of divergent lending patterns during the 5-year period. 
Meanwhile low variance suggests stability of lending composition.  
 
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the mean, median, standard deviation, 
and the Jarque-Bera test of the variables employed in this study. Since most 
variables have significant Jarque-Bera values, mean ≠ median, we believe that 
most variables are not normally distributed; thus, GLS estimation is more 
appropriate. Table 2 presents the correlation matrix of the independent variables. 
Gujarati (2003) used 0.8 as the cut-off point, indicating that values larger than 0.8 
are severely correlated and multicollinearity may be a serious problem if these 
values are included in the regression analysis. In this study, all variables have 
values less than 0.8, so incorporating all independent variables will not cause a 
multicollinearity problem.       
 
Table 3 presents the fixed effect model, which is the best model of unbalanced 
panel regression estimation. The best model is based on the selection criteria of 
Likelihood ratio and Hausman test. The goodness of fit test (R-squared) and the 
standard error of regression also showed that the fixed effect model posits the 
highest R-squared with the lowest standard error of regression. Results in Table 3 
show that the real estate lending BPS, RE, RISKY) and the specialisation (SPEC) 
indices are not significant; short-run lending portfolio stability (LCC) and 
intermediate term lending portfolio stability (VART) indicate positive 
associations. Our findings infer that both the increasing real estate lending and 
specialisation do not significantly jeopardise bank risk exposure towards stock 
market movements. The positive association for LCC implies that the stability of 
lending portfolio in the short-run increases market risk exposure. Even so, real 
estate lending does not significantly influence market risk exposure, and it should 
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be noted that a large number of non-performing loans in the BPS may aggravate 
the market risk exposure to an extent perhaps not fully reflected in the regression 
result. In June 2009, the monthly aggregate data for the Malaysian commercial 
banks showed that the highest non-performing loan came from the BPS, which is 
around 45.66% (NPL for BPS is RM14.8 million out of total NPL RM32.4 
million) (BNM Statistical Bulletin, August 2009). Unfortunately, the data 
limitation at the firm level makes it impossible to test the non-performing loans 
in real estate lending. With regard to VART, the positive relationship infers that 
the instability of lending portfolio in an intermediate term period increases 
market risk exposure. Macroeconomic disturbances, such as the increasing real 
estate price and global recession may contribute to disruptions in the lending 
structure. To the extent that macroeconomic disturbances induce divergent 
lending structure patterns with increasingly financial liberalisation, the Malaysian 
banking sector is vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks. Thus, the sector should 
be more aware of domestic and external economic developments. The lending 
structure in the medium-term period requires a balance between the increase 
demand of real estate lending and market risk exposure.   
 
With respect to the other risk determinants for market risk exposure, TL and 
MGT are the significant factors. Our results conform to the prior beliefs that loan 
expansion is positively associated with bank risk exposure. For management 
efficiency, the inverse association implies that increasing earning assets reduces 
the market risk exposure of the Malaysian banks, inferring that Malaysian banks 
are efficient in terms of managing their risk exposure, particularly in relation to 
market fluctuation. 
 
For the crisis dummies, our finding were as expected, suggesting that market risk 
exposure during and after crisis periods is higher than before the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. It is interesting to note that the positive coefficient sign for post-
crisis period infers that the recovery process is slow. Meanwhile, for the merger 
effect, we find that merger and consolidation programmes introduced by the 
central bank of Malaysia were not really fruitful since its effect was insignificant. 
Thus, the policy makers as well as the practitioners should take this information 
into account during decision making processes.   
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The impact of lending structure on market risk exposure provides some insight 
for policy makers, bankers and investors. For policy makers, the significant 
findings of LCC and VART can help to generate a proactive rather than 
corrective policy. However, policy makers should be caution that effects of bank 
lending strategies may be amplified by endogeneous changes in the sector itself.  
Aisyah Abdul Rahman 
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For instance, if the government wishes to promote the agricultural sector, several 
incentives (such as lower funding rates or a loosened loan approvals) are given in 
that particular sector. Banks may change their lending portfolio composition by 
moving towards higher-risk lending portfolios as a reaction to bank profit 
erosions resulting from a low returns in the desired sector. From the perspective 
of bankers, the significant influence of short- and medium-term lending stability 
encourages them to strategise their lending portfolios according to economic 
cycles.  Finally, for investors, knowing the determinants of market risk exposure 
enables them to effectively monitor their equity investments, thus helping 
investors to make accurate decisions. 
 
Apart from the policy implications mentioned above, this study has some caveats 
that may encourage further researchs. First, other alternative market risk 
measures, such as the default risk premiums of subordinated debt and implied 
asset risks based on bank option prices, can be adopted in examining market risk 
exposure.  However, such attempts are currently inappropriate for the Malaysian 
context because the Malaysia option and bond market are yet to be developed.  
Second, a bank's lending structure may also affect its profitability, capital 
structure decisions, and degrees of risk tolerance. In a broader context, the 
lending structure of the Malaysian banks may influence economic performance 
as a whole. Therefore, a bank's decision when strategising its lending portfolio 
should not be done in isolation, but is rather a complicated process. Therefore, 
studies on the relationship between lending structure and the potential 
interactions of those variables can be an interesting future research. Third, in 
terms of management efficiency measurements, we follow the measure adopted 
by Angbazo (1997), Ahmad and Ariff (2003; 2004), Ahmad and Ahmad (2004), 
and A. Rahman et al. (in press) which is the ratio of earning assets to total assets 
(EA/TA). More sophisticated efficiency measures, such as the Data Envelopment 
Approach (DEA) and the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA), are used to 
measure bank efficiency. Hence, further exploration of this aspect is urgently 
needed. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1 Loan by sector: (1) agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; (2) mining and quarrying;                 
(3) manufacturing; (4) electricity, gas and water; (5) broad property sectors; (6) wholesale, retail 
trade, restaurants and hotels; (7) transport, storage and communication; (8) finance, insurance 
and business services; (9) purchase of securities; (10) purchase of transport vehicles;                     
(11) consumption credit; and (12) others.  
 
 Meanwhile, loan by economic purpose: (1) agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing;                        
(2) mining and quarrying; (3) manufacturing; (4) electricity, gas and water; (5) broad property 
sectors; (6) wholesale, retail trade, restaurants and hotels; (7) transport, storage and 
Lending structure and market risk exposures 
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communication; (8) finance, insurance and business services; (9) purchase of securities;                       
(10) purchase of transport vehicles; (11) consumption credit; (12) community, social, and 
personal services; (13) general commerce; and (14) others. 
2  In Madura et al. (1994), the deposit-taking institutions comprise the commercial banks and 
saving institutions. The ex-ante risk measure is implied based on call option price. They analyse 
nine variables that reflect credit, capital, interest rate, and business operation.   
3  With regards to the depository institutions, real estate lending and real estate owned are the 
determinants for the implied risk exposures. Meanwhile, the real estate owned and capital buffer 
are the determinants for the case of commercial banks. 
4  In Ahmad and Ariff (2003), the deposit-taking institutions comprise the commercial and 
merchant banks. 
5  The BSV are: NPL/TL; Lag NPL; MGT (earning asset/TA); LEV(Tier2/Total Capital); RISKY 
sector loan (BPS + purchase of securities + consumption credit); Regulatory Capital (Tier 1/TL); 
Cost of Fund; Loan loss provision; Risk Weighted Asset; KLIBOR; SPREAD; GAP; 
Loan/Deposit; total asset. 
6  The determinants for market risk exposure are loan quality, cost of fund, loan expansion, and 
lending structure. The determinants for unsystematic risk are loan quality, cost of fund, and 
interest rate.  For total risk exposure, the unsystematic risk determinants remain significant plus 
additional variable, the loan expansion. Finally, the regulatory capital is the only significant 
determinant for equity risk. 
7 Credit variables: (i) loan sales, (ii) loan loss reserve, (iii) diversification index; capital variable: 
leverage; interest rate variable: GAP; Business variable: (i) Size; (ii) Div Payout Ratio. All 
except size are deflated by total asset.  
8  Please refer to Hassan (1993) for the detail explanation of the implied asset subordinated debt 
models.   
9  (1) Capital variable: book value of equity/(total asset – cash – fed funds sold-securities);                
(2) Liquidity variable: (cash + net fed fund + securities)/Total Asset; (3) Lending structure: 
(commercial + industrial loan)/Asset; and (commercial Real estate loans)/Asset. 
10  The four risk measures are: (i) σROE; (ii) σROA; (iii) σLLP./TL; and (iv) σnpl/TL. 
11  Business variables: size and non-interest income/TA; capital variable: TE/TA, Liquidity 
variable: liquid asset/TA; credit variable: PLL/TA and total loan/TA; Interest variable: net 
interest income/TA 
12  Credit variable: TL/TA; Capital variable; TA/TE; investment variable: Investment 
securities/TA; (Sales Fed fund-purchased Fed fund)/TA (-); Mutual fund asset: MFA/TA; 
Business variable: size. 
13  Business variables: (i) size; (ii) profitability differences (ROA and ROE); (iii) business 
differences (deposit to total asset); and (iv) personnel expenses to total assets.  Credit variable is 
total loan to total asset, and capital variable is total equity to total asset. 
14  Madura et al. (1994) and Blasko and Sinkey Jr (2006) focus on loan given specific to real estate 
sector (RE), which comprise of residential, non-residential properties, and real estate. In 
Malaysia, broad property sector (BPS) comprises of RE and construction sector. Roza Hazli 
(2007) employs BPS as a proxy for real estate lending. Meanwhile, Ahmad and Ariff (2003; 
2004) and Ahmad and Ahmad (2004) employ RISKY sector lending. Their RISKY sector 
comprises of loan given to BPS, purchase of securities and consumption credit. All measures 
are ratios to total loan.  
15  Twelve sectors are employed to construct lending indices representing characteristics of bank 
lending compositions. The 12 sectors are agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; mining and 
quarrying; manufacturing; electricity, gas and water; broad property sectors; wholesale, retail 
trade, restaurants and hotels; transport, storage and communication; finance, insurance and 
business services; purchase of securities; purchase of transport vehicles; consumption credit; 
and others.    
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